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Abstract
Context. The recurrence of past security breaches in healthcare showed that lessons had not
been effectively learned across different healthcare organisations. Recent studies have identified
the need to improve learning from incidents and to share security knowledge to prevent future at-
tacks. Generic Security Templates (GSTs) have been proposed to facilitate this knowledge transfer.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate whether potential users in healthcare organisations can
exploit the GST technique to share lessons learned from security incidents.
Methodology. We conducted a series of case studies to evaluate GSTs. In particular, we used a
GST for a security incident in the US Veterans’ Affairs Administration to explore whether security
lessons could be applied in a very different Chinese healthcare organisation.
Results. The results showed that Chinese security professional accepted the use of GSTs and
that cyber security lessons could be transferred to a Chinese healthcare organisation using this
approach. The users also identified the weaknesses and strengths of GSTs, providing suggestions
for future improvements.
Conclusion. Generic Security Templates can be used to redistribute lessons learned from secu-
rity incidents. Sharing cyber security lessons helps organisations consider their own practices and
assess whether applicable security standards address concerns raised in previous breaches in other
countries. The experience gained from this study provides the basis for future work in conducting
similar studies in other healthcare organisations.
Keywords: Generic Security Template, lessons learned, security incident, knowledge
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1. Introduction
Security incidents have affected healthcare organisations across the world. For example there
are strong similarities between the US Veterans’ Affairs Administration (VA) 2007 data loss inci-
dent [1], the Shenzhen 2008, the Chinese data loss incident [2] and the UK National Health Service
(NHS) Surrey security Asset disposal incident [3]. However, these examples are just the tip of the
iceberg. Symantec reported that the healthcare industry accounted for 36% of all security incident
breaches in 2013 [4]. At 44%, the healthcare industry continues to be the sector responsible for
the largest percentage of disclosed data breaches by industries in 2014 [5]. Such incidents can
result in the loss of company/organisational reputation and customer confidence, legal issues, a
loss of productivity and direct financial losses [6]. The focus in Healthcare lessons learned and
information exchange has been on safety [7–13] rather than security [14–16].
Governments have realised the importance of learning from security incidents. A number of
initiatives support the exchange of information about previous breaches. For example, the UK gov-
ernment has launched the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP). This is intended
to help government and industry share and redistribute intelligence on cyber security threats. The
partnership includes the introduction of a secure virtual ‘collaboration environment’ where stake-
holders can exchange information on threats and vulnerabilities in real time [17]. There is a need
to foster an environment where different parties can speak the same language while redistributing
this information.
The recommendations and insights derived from previous security incidents are usually dis-
seminated through a series of formal and informal reports, meetings and presentations to man-
agement [18, 19]. For example, NHS disseminates lessons learned from security incidents using
team meetings, notice boards, incident reporting and investigation training courses (e.g. use of
case studies), email, newsletter, internal alert systems and so on [20]. Meetings are held and notes
are gathered to document responses, disagreements, suggestions and additions to security policies
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and incident procedures [18]. Issues to document include the effects of the damage, actions taken
during the incident, policies and procedures that require a change and evidence that can be used
for pursuing the responsible person(s) [21]. It is expected that healthcare organisations will act on
these lessons, for instance by changes in procedures or training processes and incident response
policies. However, previous case studies show that security lessons have not been effectively re-
distributed within many organisations [22–24].
Generic Security Templates [25] have been developed to represent lessons learned from secu-
rity incidents. They extend the application of the existing Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) [26]
to support the exchange of lessons learned in the aftermath of data breaches. GSTs represent the
links between particular findings and the requirements of security standards and policies at a level
of abstraction that is intended to support reuse. In this paper, we conducted a series of studies to
evaluate whether users can exploit GSTs to redistribute lessons learned from a specific security
incident from the US Veterans Affairs Administration into a healthcare organisation in China.
The remainder of the paper is structured as the following. Section 2 reviews related work.
Section 3 introduces GSTs. Section 4 presents our first evaluation of this approach, GST accep-
tance testing. Section 5 presents a second evaluation, the implementation of the approach within
a Chinese healthcare organisation. Section 6 discusses the findings, and Section 7 summarises
conclusions and future work.
2. Related work
2.1. Incident learning
A key activity in Security Incident Response and Handling (SIRH) is to learn from errors or
mistakes made during previous incidents. It is important to identify policies and processes that
undermine existing defences. It is also important to identify any weaknesses in staff competency.
These insights must then be fed-back into security management processes [18, 19]. Recent studies
have provided rich controls for preventing information security threats and vulnerabilities, includ-
ing technical countermeasures (e.g., anti-virus software tools), and organisational defences (e.g.
security standards). However, reflection on security incident response is typically limited to the
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technical process and does not leverage opportunities to learn about the security threat environment
and the effectiveness of internal procedures, controls, training and policies in order to strengthen
the organisation’s information security management systems [27, 28]. There is relatively little
research into effective means of disseminating security recommendations and best practices be-
tween organisations. The lessons from previous security incidents contain rich information about
the causes of previous breaches. Failure to learn from previous incidents seems to be a common
trait across many different kinds of security incidents [23].
2.2. Incident learning in healthcare
The loss of patient data can affect both the individuals concerned and healthcare organisations
responsible for securing that data. If a patient’s information is disclosed accidentally or uninten-
tionally, it may constitute an infringement of privacy. Disclosure can cause embarrassment. It may
also have an impact on an individual’s career. The loss of patient data can have other long-term
financial implications, including the loss of health insurance [29]. Data can also be sold on to other
criminals, for example to support identity theft. From the perspective of healthcare organisations,
security incidents can cause significant damage to reputation. They may also lead to fines, for
instance under the new European Commissioners’ Data Privacy Directive (Directive 95/46/EC)
[30]. Therefore it is imperative for healthcare organisations to learn the lessons that have been
identified following previous incidents and take actions to prevent any recurrence.
In Europe and North America, there are legislative requirements to report security incidents
[20, 31, 32]. A key aim of incident reporting is to prevent any future recurrence of previous inci-
dents not only in the organisation where the incident occurred but in other healthcare institutions
[20]. In China, there have not been legislative requirements for healthcare organisations to report
or exchange security incidents. Partly in consequence, information security has not attracted sig-
nificant attention from healthcare providers [33, 34], although some attempts have been made to
protect patient data [35–38]. Gao suggests two main reasons for the lack of motivation: (1) the
Chinese traditional culture does not address the importance of personal privacy; and (2) healthcare
systems in China are still in their infancy and there has not been large-scale health data exchange
that can potentially trigger large amounts of privacy violations [39]. However, the implementation
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of healthcare information systems can hardly be successful if information privacy cannot be en-
sured [40]. There is a need to learn successful practices from international experience to improve
healthcare security management systems [39].
3. Generic Security Templates (GST)
This section introduces GSTs and related work. GSTs build on previous research into safety
assurance cases [41]. Instead of collecting evidence to argue that the design and operation of an
existing application is acceptably safe, GSTs collect the insights that have been derived when a
system has proven NOT to be acceptably secure. They represent security lessons (i.e. information
about the causes of a breach and subsequent recommendations) from previous incidents and map
them to the requirements of healthcare information security management systems.
3.1. Definition of the Generic Security Template
A Generic Security Template is “a documented body of lessons identified from a security inci-
dent that is intended to provide feedback about the implementation of specific security standards
or guidelines ” [25]. The GST links the analysis of an incident to specific security standards or
guidelines that help to implement particular recommendations. Figure 1 provides a customised
Goal Structuring Notation from the domain of safety analysis for our cyber security GSTs. There
are four principal syntactic components, A Goal is a claim, the statements that the goal structure
is designed to support. Lessons learned exist to support different levels of goals. It refers to the
security issues (causes of a security incident); and the security recommendations that are intended
to avoid any recurrence of a data breach [25]. Strategy is inserted between goals at two levels
of abstraction, to explain how the top-level goal is addressed by the aggregation of sub-goals.
Context is used to declare supplementary information and provide adequate understanding of the
context surrounding the claim/strategy. Usually it presents concepts clarification introduced in the
claim/strategy [42]. Examples of the application of GSTs can be found in [25, 43–45].
3.2. Represent security lessons using the GST
GSTs provide a graphical overview of the mapping between the causes/recommendations de-
rived from security incidents and the guidelines/policies/standards/regulations that are intended
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Figure 1: Customised GSN Notations for GST
to prevent any recurrence of a data breach. The following section summarises the steps that are
needed when a GST is developed to represent a security incident. Figure 2 provides an example
instance created for a real world case study, the US Veterans Affairs’ Administration data loss
incident from 2007 [1]. More details can be found in [25, 43].
• Prepare the Goal Structure. The top level goal is to ensure that a healthcare system is ac-
ceptably secure in the aftermath of an incident. This high-level goal is then decomposed into
sub-goals that each reflects more detailed objectives within a security management system.
The GST identifies sub-goals by using security requirements within the applicable standards
and guidelines in particular healthcare organisations. For example, the example in Figure
2 used the structured category of security requirements of the General Control in Federal
Information Security Control Audit Manual (FISCAM) [46] as the goal structure.
• Identify the Lessons Learned from the security incident. Lessons learned are identified by
searching incident reports for security recommendations. These are then introduced into the
GST using a structured textual format. For each security issue, the GST uses short <Noun-
Phrase> sentences, for example, “Sensitive Information”, to describe specific security issue.
For the recommendation, the GST uses <Verb-Phrase> <Noun-Phrase>, for example, “Use
encryption or effective tool to protect personal identifiable information” to describe security
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Figure 2: The GST created for the VA Dataloss Incident7
recommendations.
• Map Lessons Learned to the Goal Structure. The lessons learned are then mapped to differ-
ent levels of the goal structure. The analyst has to identify the relationships between security
sub-goals, based on standards, guidelines and policies, and the lessons learned from a previ-
ous security incident. Figure 2 shows how lessons can be introduced into a GST at different
levels of abstraction.
• Elaborate the Context and Strategy. Strategies are inserted between goals and sub-goals.
They justify goal decomposition. Thses typically refer to the security standards, organisa-
tional guidelines, regulations and policies. The GST exploits a simplified sentence structure,
for example, “Argument over FISCAM” to describe strategies. Context was used to provide
supplementary information for a specific incident. The context notations are elaborated dur-
ing this process. For example, “Federal Information Security Controls Audit Manual”, is
used to explain the concept “FISCAM” in the strategy.
4. Evaluation 1 - acceptance of the GST
4.1. Target Organisation
A five months internship was accepted in 2013, with a Chinese healthcare organisation, the
redacted hospital. The internship was to support a newly initiated Security Strengthening Pro-
gram (SSP). The redacted hospital started using an electronic healthcare system from 2008 and
was looking for recommendations to improve their security system. This internship provided an
opportunity to obtain more knowledge about information security management in healthcare or-
ganisations in China and their support enabled us to conduct an exploratory case study.
The host organisation is a tertiary level hospital in China and has the highest level of maturity
in terms of healthcare information systems. Its security management is subject to compliance
regulation through security standard GB/T22239 (Information security technology - Baseline for
classified protection of information system) [47]. This Chinese security guidance uses a five-level
classification system. Organisations are required to comply with the GB/T22239, by achieving
an appropriate level. For example, the guidance of the health industry information security level
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protection issued by the Ministry of Health of the Peoples Republic of China requires that health
information systems and related units should be self-examined in accordance with GB/T22239. In
particular, the tertiary level hospital needs to achieve at least the third security level characterised
in GB/T22239 [48].
4.2. Participants
To understand different stakeholders’ acceptance of GSTs, we interviewed people from dif-
ferent roles which included healthcare professionals (doctors, nurses) and security professionals.
Since the aim of the study was to explore users’ experiences of the GST approach, rather than
generalising the results, we focused on a small number of participants. This provided suitable
coverage of stakeholders across the organisation. Information sheets were disseminated to each
department of the redacted hospital and details were put up on notice boards. The participants
attended the study voluntarily. The study adhered to the BPS ethical guidelines, and had been
approved by an ethics committee of the University of Glasgow (ref: CSE01243). Participants
completed a consent form before starting the study.
4.3. Study design
This evaluation was intended to identify general attitudes towards the use of graphical struc-
tures to represent lessons learned in previous security breaches. The participants were presented
with the specific security diagram created for the VAs 2007 data loss incident, illustrated in Figure
2. They were given a tutorial that introduced the notations and approach. They were given some
time to study the graph and were then asked questions. The interview started after the participants
had clarified any remaining concerns about the approach. This interview compared the GST with
any existing methods used to redistribute lessons from security incidents.
Due to the explorative nature of this study, we conducted unstructured interviews during nor-
mal working hours. We were not allowed to record the conversation due to the sensitivity of the
research themes. In qualitative data analysis, transcription, analysis and verification are interwo-
ven before, during and after data collection [49]. This iterative approach was utilised in the current
study and reflects the constraints on any research of this nature across national borders in critical
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environments. For example, during data collection and transcription, possible ideas and questions
were noted down. After the interview, a summary based on the transcribed interviews was sent
to participants, for validation. The field notes were then coded and these codes were categorised
in relation to technology acceptance frames [50]. The data was further cross-referenced with the
collected document for triangulation [51].
4.4. Results
4.5. Participants background
The healthcare professionals who participated in this study, included four doctors (males) and
six nurses (females). Five security professionals participated in this study, four of them were secu-
rity engineers (one female and three males) and one of them was a security manager (male). The
educational background of the security professionals ranged from those with a BSc qualification
to those with the equivalent of an MSc. All of the security engineers had experience with secu-
rity incident handling. Among the healthcare professionals, two nurses and one doctor had been
involved in the security incident handling process. The rest had no experience with information
security. Further background information is summarised in Appendix A.
4.6. Attitudes towards the GST
The participants were presented with a GST instance as shown in Figure 2. They were then
invited to comment on the GST. The security professionals and healthcare professionals demon-
strated different perspectives towards the use of the GST. According to Orlikowski and Gash [50],
various organisational stakeholders interpret technology in different ways. An understanding of
people’s interpretations of technology is critical to understanding their acceptance of it [50]. We
adopt Orlikowski and Gash’s idea of technological frames to analyse our results.
• Nature of Technology, refers to people’s perceptions of the technology and their understand-
ing of its capabilities and functionalities.
• Technology Strategy, refers to people’s views of why their organisation acquired and imple-
mented the technology. It includes their understanding of the motivation or vision behind
the adoption decision, and its likely value to the organisation.
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• Technology-in-Use, refers to people’s understanding of how the technology will be used on a
day-to-day basis, and the likely or actual conditions and consequences associated with such
use.
4.6.1. Healthcare professionals’ attitudes
Nature of Technology
The healthcare professionals demonstrated a basic understanding of the GST. They considered
it to be “some way similar to the communication of security incidents in departmental meetings”.
They identified the benefits of the GST in representing security incidents. A healthcare profes-
sional said, “it makes things clearer, it breaks down issues into details”, “we can easily focus on a
specific issue they (security professionals) talk about ”.
Technology Strategy
The healthcare professionals believed that the use of the GST helped to formalise communi-
cation about security incidents, as compared to previous appoaches that relied on informal pre-
sentations and meetings. As stated by one of the healthcare professionals, “previously, different
security professionals present security incidents using their own language and ideas, but I like this
structured way, that makes everything easier to follow”. However, there were also concerns raised
about using GSTs. As stated by a healthcare professional, “I am not sure if it is necessary to make
the changes, as we rarely communicate incidents unless after a severe security incident ”.
Technology-in-Use
The Chinese healthcare professionals had some difficulties in understanding technical terms in
our GST from the United States VA case study. One participant felt that, “if you had not explained
the concept of ‘access control’, I could not understand it by myself”. They suggested either a sup-
porting document providing definitions for technical terms or that they needed help from security
professionals. They also complained about the “lack of multi-view design” in the GST. As stated
by a healthcare professional, “‘access control’ seems to be the security professionals’ responsi-
bility ”. In other words, they would have liked a simplified GST that focusses only on security
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lessons for Healthcare professionals and another more detailed diagram for IT security staff.
4.6.2. Security professionals’ attitudes
Nature of Technology
Security professionals also found the GST to be effective in representing security incidents.
One participant stated that, “this will be especially helpful to discuss security issues; it is easier to
navigate between different notations”. The security manager stated “it brings together everything
that involves different stakeholders; it can facilitate decision making and balance the interests of
different stakeholders in a discussion ”.
Compared to healthcare professionals, security staff demonstrated a deeper understanding of
our GST in terms of its capabilities and limitations. They believed that it was a good way to inform
the implementation of security standards. A security professional stated “it provides a process to
track what goes wrong at which level in the security standards that causes the incident ”. “It can
let us know how well we have implemented the security standards and which part needs to be
improved”. Moreover, they found the lessons which cannot be mapped to any security require-
ments especially helpful. One security professional said, “this will help us identify a new security
requirement that was not considered by the standard”.
Technology Strategy
The security professionals believed that, the use of GSTs tended to change the way to report
and communicate security incidents. They mentioned that, presenting lessons in this way “helps
to identify management causes, which might be the inappropriate implementation of a standard,
rather than the specific technical causes”. This is consistent with previous studies that organisa-
tional security incident handling focusses on direct causes rather than underlying procedures or
policies [52]. The security professionals also identified the GST’s role as “bringing together infor-
mation and notes generated in the security incident handling process, and an easier way to track
previous lessons”.
Technology-in-Use
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To use GSTs, security professionals would have to learn a new technique to report security
incidents. One of the participants complained “I cannot predict how effective it will be, and how
worthwhile the efforts are ”. However, from a long term perspective, the security professionals
tended to agree that “the benefits might outweigh the efforts once everyone starts getting used to
this new technique ”. This is consistent with the findings in safety, where GSN has been widely
adopted. The proponents of GSN argue that its expressive power repay the cost in learning to use
the approach [53].
Participants were also concerned about the scalability of GSTs in everyday use, “the template
could become unmanageable for a complex incident or for the integration of many less serious
breaches”. This issue can be addressed by experience from GSN to improve safety. Our notation
also benefits from the modular concepts that have already been used in this existing approach
[54, 54]. However, further work is required to apply these techniques to security incidents.
Security and healthcare professionals had different interpretations of the GST. They made the
judgments based on their own knowledge, experience and work style. To the healthcare profes-
sionals, the GST served as an effective tool to represent security incidents, however, they did not
see this tool as essential for their organisation in their everyday work. They were concerned about
the effort to learn and adopt such a new technique. In comparison, security professionals identified
the advantages in using GSTs to inform the implementation of security standards. Although they
might have to learn a new technique, they still believed the long term benefits were worthwhile.
4.6.3. Strengths and weaknesses
Based on the analysis above, the strengths and weaknesses of our approach are summarised in
Table 1 and 2.
4.6.4. Scenarios for applying GSTs
The healthcare and security professionals who supported the use of GSTs helped to identify
potential scenarios:
Scenario I: communicate security incidents in department meeting. Healthcare professionals
found GSTs useful in representing lessons learned from security incidents, and suggested adopting
this method for demonstrating security incidents in department meetings in the future.
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Table 1: The strengths of the GST
The Strengths Healthcare Professionals Security Professionals
Effective Communi-
cation
... some way similar to the com-
munication of security incidents in
the department meeting ... easier
to navigate between different no-
tations ... it makes things clearer,
breakdown issue into details ... we
can easily focus on a specific issue
they (security professionals) talk
about ...
... this will be especially helpful
to discuss security issues ... easier
to navigate between different no-
tations ... it brings together every-
thing that involves different stake-
holders ... it can facilitate the de-
cision making and balance the in-
terests of different stakeholders in
a discussion ...
Formalised Repre-
sentation
... previously, different security
professionals present security inci-
dents using different ways of their
own, but I like this structured way,
that makes everything easy to fol-
low ...
... bringing together pieces of
notes generated in the security
incident handling process, and
an easier way to track previous
lessons ...
Linkage to Security
Management Proce-
dures
... a process to track what goes
wrong at which level in the secu-
rity standards that causes the in-
cident; ... let us know how well
we have implemented the security
standards and which part needs to
be improved; ... this will help
us identify a new security require-
ment that was not considered by
the standard or organisation.
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Table 2: The weaknesses of the GST
The Weaknesses Healthcare Professionals Security Professionals
Learning Efforts ... I am not sure if it is necessary
to make the changes, as we rarely
communicate incidents unless af-
ter a severe security incident ...
... cannot predict how effective it
will be, and how worthwhile the
efforts are.
Scalability ... template could become unman-
ageable if it documents a complex
incident or it is an integration of
many tiny incidents.
Comprehension ... if you don’t explain the concept
‘access control’, I could not under-
stand it by myself ...
Multi-view Design ... lack of multi-view design ...
‘access control’ seems to be secu-
rity professional’s responsibility.
Scenario II: inform the implementation of security standards. Security professionals found
GSTs useful in informing the implementation of security standards. Future work is needed to
focus on how GSTs can inform the implementation of standards.
A previous study had already provided evidence that GSTs can improve the communication of
security lessons compared to traditional text based approaches [45]. The next section, therefore,
expands on Scenario II to find out how the GST can be used to redistribute security lessons into
security management procedures.
5. Evaluation 2 - redistribution of the security lessons
The interviews with healthcare professionals in China provided initial insights into the appli-
cation of GSTs. However, we were also anxious to look beyond subjective impressions to provide
more direct evidence about whether or not security lessons from previous incidents can be redis-
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tributed to the redacted hospital. In particular, we used the diagram for the VA 2007 data loss
incident as shown in Figure 2 to investigate whether Chinese healthcare professionals could reuse
security lessons from this US incident.
5.1. Study design
In the redacted hospital, whenever a decision in information security has to be made, different
stakeholders in the organisation are gathered together to discuss the issues. However, the final
decision will be made by the security manager based on these different views. We, therefore,
conducted a group study with the participants to gather a range of views about the utility the
GST. The relevant security manager within the hospital agreed to participate in the session. Our
group consisted of six people working in the redacted hospital. These included three healthcare
professionals, two security experts and one security manager.
The interaction among group participants often reduces the need for the moderator to inter-
vene or bias individual members of the group. In this way, group dynamics help to reduce the
researchers’ influence on the interview process [55]. Group study can stimulate thinking and ver-
bal contributions. In the study, group participants were asked to identify lessons that they could
apply from the VA incident. To avoid fatigue the meeting was divided into two sessions. Each
one lasted for 1 to 1.5 hours. In both sessions, a security engineer accompanied the researcher
and together they maintained field notes to document the group discussion. A set of group study
guidelines (open-ended questions) was developed for the moderator including probes designed to
refocus the discussion if necessary.
• Does your organisation have security concerns (e.g. “issues with Sensitive Information”)
issue?
• Do you think these recommendations are helpful for your organisation?
• Would you be able to apply this recommendation?
• What are the barriers for you to apply this recommendation?
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5.2. Execution of the first session and results
As mentioned, the security management system of the redacted hospital is based on the Chi-
nese security standard, GB/T 22239. The focus group, therefore, decided to replace the goal
structure of the VA 2007 data loss incident, which identified recommendations associated with
the implementation of US FISCAM requirements with the equivalent Chinese regulations. They
chose to focus on the provisions within GB/T22239 that might help to avoid any similar incident
in their hospital. This process lasted over an hour and included a detailed analysis of the clauses
in GB/T22239 as well as the VA 2007 incident.
The overall process of replacing the US FISCAM requirements with the provisions of China’s
GB/T22239 followed the same processes that guided the creation of the incident map. The first
two steps “(1) Prepare the goal structure” and “(2) Identify the Lessons Learned from the security
incident” were very easy because the goal structure (i.e. GB/T22239) and lessons learned (i.e.
leaf nodes lessons learned in Figure 2 were readily available. By following the step “(3) Map
the Lessons Learned to the Goal Structure”, they decided the mapping of the lessons learned
to different levels of the security requirements of the security standard (i.e. GB/T22239). By
following “(4) Elaborate the Context and Strategies”, they have set the Strategy as “Argument over
GB/T22239” and the Context as “The redacted hospital”. Figure 3 shows the resulting instance of
the GST.
The process of mapping between the US case study and the context in Chinese healthcare
yielded some significant insights. For instance, “Risk Analysis” was changed under the stratogy
“Argument over All missing Recommendations”. It identified a new security requirement that was
probably missed by GB/T22239. Several other lessons in the VA case study associated with policy
issues, were changed to lessons about “Management Structure” and about the handling of “Sen-
sitive Information”. In other words, the Chinese focus group looked more at the implementation
and operation of security management systems rather than on the provision of policy documents
and guidelines. These differences in emphasis may be due to the particular biases of the Chinese
participants. Equally they may also suggest valuable alternative insights that could be communi-
cated back to the VA. The key issue is that the process of applying lessons from breaches in one
country to another reveals valuable questions for further research. There seem to be considerable
17
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
:
R
e-
ev
al
u
at
e 
an
d
 c
o
rr
ec
t 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 s
en
si
ti
v
e 
le
v
el
.
R
is
k
 A
n
a
ly
si
s:
 
D
ev
el
o
p
 a
n
d
 i
ss
u
e 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t-
w
id
e 
ri
sk
 a
n
al
y
si
s 
cr
it
er
ia
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
: 
E
st
ab
li
sh
 a
 f
u
n
ct
io
n
al
 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 a
n
d
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
p
la
n
 t
o
 c
la
ri
fy
 t
h
e 
li
n
e 
au
th
o
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g
 
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
.
A
cc
es
s 
C
o
n
tr
o
l:
 
A
v
o
id
 t
h
e 
ab
u
se
 o
f 
p
ro
g
ra
m
m
er
 l
ev
el
 a
cc
es
s 
co
n
tr
o
l.
S
en
si
ti
v
e 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
:
U
se
 e
n
cr
y
p
ti
o
n
, 
o
r 
o
th
er
 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
to
o
l,
 t
o
 p
ro
te
ct
 
p
er
so
n
al
ly
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ab
le
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 s
to
re
d
 o
n
 
re
m
o
v
ab
le
 s
to
ra
g
e.
A
rg
u
m
en
t 
o
v
er
 A
ll
 
M
is
si
n
g
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
R
ec
o
m
m
en
d
at
io
n
s
(S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 n
o
n
-e
x
is
te
n
t)
: 
G
o
v
er
n
m
en
t-
w
id
e 
ri
sk
 
an
al
y
si
s 
cr
it
er
ia
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
A
ct
io
n
:
T
ak
e 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ac
ti
o
n
 a
g
ai
n
st
 t
h
e 
p
eo
p
le
 
in
v
o
lv
ed
 i
n
 t
h
is
 i
n
ci
d
en
t 
fo
r 
th
ei
r 
in
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
ac
ti
o
n
s.
8
.2
: 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
R
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 a
re
 
ad
d
re
ss
edH
ea
lt
h
ca
re
 S
y
st
em
 (
H
S
) 
is
 
ac
ce
p
ta
b
ly
 S
ec
u
re
 
8
.1
: 
T
ec
h
n
ic
al
 
R
eq
u
ir
em
en
ts
 a
re
 
ad
d
re
ss
ed
A
rg
u
m
en
t 
o
v
er
 
G
B
/T
2
2
2
3
9
H
ea
lt
h
ca
re
 S
y
st
em
 o
f 
th
e 
R
ed
ac
te
d
 H
o
sp
it
al
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 S
ta
n
d
ar
d
 
C
h
in
a
8
.1
.5
.2
 D
at
a 
co
n
fi
d
en
ti
al
it
y
 (
S
4
) 
is
 
ad
d
re
ss
ed
 
8
.1
.5
.2
.b
 U
se
 e
n
cr
y
p
ti
o
n
 o
r 
o
th
er
 p
ro
te
ct
iv
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
fo
r 
sy
st
em
 d
at
a 
m
an
ag
em
en
t,
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 i
d
en
ti
fi
ca
ti
o
n
, 
an
d
 t
h
e 
st
o
ra
g
e 
o
f 
cr
it
ic
al
 
b
u
si
n
es
s 
d
at
a 
  
8
.2
.2
.1
 P
o
si
ti
o
n
 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
 (
G
4
) 
is
 
ad
d
re
ss
ed8
.2
.2
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
 
is
 a
d
d
re
ss
ed
8
.1
.4
 A
p
p
li
ca
ti
o
n
 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 i
s 
ad
d
re
ss
ed
8
.1
.4
.3
.d
 M
in
im
u
m
 
re
q
u
ir
ed
 p
er
m
is
si
o
n
s 
sh
o
u
ld
 b
e 
g
ra
n
te
d
 t
o
 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
ac
co
u
n
ts
8
.2
.5
.1
2
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
In
ci
d
en
t 
H
an
d
li
n
g
 (
G
4
) 
is
 a
d
d
re
ss
ed
8
.2
.1
.1
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
P
o
li
cy
 (
G
4
) 
is
 
ad
d
re
ss
ed
8
.2
.1
 S
ec
u
ri
ty
 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
P
o
li
cy
 i
s 
ad
d
re
ss
ed
8
.1
.5
 D
at
a 
se
cu
ri
ty
 a
n
d
 
re
co
v
er
y
 a
re
 a
d
d
re
ss
ed
8
.1
.4
.3
 A
cc
es
s 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
(S
4
) 
is
 a
d
d
re
ss
ed
8
.2
.5
 S
y
st
em
 o
p
er
at
io
n
 
an
d
 m
ai
n
te
n
an
ce
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
ar
e 
ad
d
re
ss
ed
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
u
n
n
ec
es
sa
ry
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
te
d
 w
it
h
 
cu
st
o
m
is
a
ti
o
n
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
ta
b
le
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
ta
b
le
 
w
it
h
 c
u
st
o
m
is
a
ti
o
n
$
 R
es
er
v
ed
 f
o
r 
fu
tu
re
 u
se
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
ta
b
le
 w
it
h
 
cu
st
o
m
is
a
ti
o
n
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 P
o
li
cy
:
 D
is
c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
 s
to
ri
n
g
  
e
m
a
il 
o
n
 u
n
a
u
th
o
ri
s
e
d
 
s
y
s
te
m
 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 P
o
li
cy
:
E
n
s
u
re
 h
u
m
a
n
 s
u
b
je
c
ts
 i
n
 
re
s
e
a
rc
h
, 
c
o
m
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
re
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 P
o
li
cy
:
E
n
s
u
re
 t
h
a
t 
d
a
ta
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
p
la
n
s
 f
o
r 
re
s
e
a
rc
h
 
p
ro
je
c
ts
 c
o
m
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
in
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 s
e
c
u
ri
ty
 
p
o
lic
ie
s
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
te
d
$
 R
es
er
v
ed
 f
o
r 
fu
tu
re
 u
se
$
 I
m
p
le
m
en
te
d
 w
it
h
 
cu
st
o
m
is
a
ti
o
n
A
cc
es
s 
C
o
n
tr
o
l:
 
W
ar
n
 t
h
e 
se
cu
ri
ty
 e
n
g
in
ee
rs
 
o
f 
th
e 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
ca
u
se
d
 
b
y
 w
ro
n
g
ly
 g
ra
n
ti
n
g
 a
cc
es
s 
co
n
tr
o
l 
th
ro
u
g
h
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
t 
m
ee
ti
n
g
. 
S
ec
u
ri
ty
 P
o
li
cy
:
E
n
s
u
re
 h
u
m
a
n
 s
u
b
je
c
ts
 i
n
 
re
s
e
a
rc
h
,c
o
m
p
ly
 w
it
h
 
“C
h
in
a
 P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 
A
c
t.
”
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 D
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
:
D
ef
in
e 
th
e 
p
o
si
ti
o
n
 
se
n
si
ti
v
e 
le
v
el
.
A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
v
e 
A
ct
io
n
:
T
ak
e 
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ac
ti
o
n
 a
g
ai
n
st
 t
h
e 
p
eo
p
le
 
in
v
o
lv
ed
 i
n
 t
h
is
 i
n
ci
d
en
t 
fo
r 
th
ei
r 
in
ap
p
ro
p
ri
at
e 
ac
ti
o
n
s 
ac
co
rd
in
g
 t
o
 t
h
e 
“C
h
in
a
 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
In
fo
rm
a
ti
o
n
 P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 
A
c
t.
”
Figure 3: The customised GST for the VA 2007 Dataloss Incident
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opportunities to work together to increase the security of patient data in an area that is traditionally
characterised by mutual suspicion.
5.3. Execution of the second session and results
In the first session, the focus group related the findings from the VA case study to the provisions
in the Chinese standard GB/T22239. They were not asked to consider whether or not they could
be implemented within their own healthcare organisation. In contrast, the second session traversed
the new diagram to identify any barriers to the application of the lessons derived from the VA case
study. These discussions lasted for a further hour.
The group followed an identifiable process in assessing the acceptability of lessons within their
own organisation. They began by assessing whether each issue that arose for the VA was also a
significant concern in their hospital. They would then decide whether to accept the recommenda-
tion, or customise US recommendations to suit their own context. The acceptance of the lessons
were categorised into the following six types reflected in Figure 3,
Implemented. Some of the lessons identified from the VA case study had already been im-
plemented within Chinese security management system. For example, the “Security Policy” rec-
ommendation to “Ensure that data security plans for research projects comply with information
security policies”;
Implemented with customisation. Some of the lessons identified within the VA case study had
already been addressed by the organisation but with a slightly different emphasis or approach. For
example, for the “Security Policy” recommendation to “Ensure the handling of human subjects
in research, complies with HIPAA rules”. In the Chinese context, the hospital required that elec-
tronic records relating to human subjects were held in compliance with the relevant national data
protection laws.
Implementable. Some of the issues identified in the VA incident had not yet been addressed by
the Chinese hospital, however, they accepted the need to consider this finding. For example, the VA
report recommended changes in the “Management Structure” to “Establish an accurate functional
description and performance plan to clarify the line authority and reporting relationship”. The
Chinese group felt that it would be useful to review their existing practices using the insights
19
derived from the US case study data breach.
Implementable with customisation. Some of the security issues identified in the VA case study
had not been addressed by the organisation, however, the group felt that they could not be imple-
mented without considerable changes within their own organisation. For example, the VA report
identified the need to “Re-evaluate and correct position sensitivity levels”. This process had not
been formalised with the Chinese hospital, hence the focus group rephrased it as “Define position
sensitive levels”.
Reserved for future use. The penultimate category describes findings that could be reapplied
in China but their implementation would take a considerable period of time, for instance where
the security management system was not sufficiently mature. For example, the VA recommended
that staff “Use encryption, or other effective tools, to protect personal identifiable information
stored on removable storage”. The Chinese hospital forbade the use of removable media hence
this recommendation was not immediately applicable. However, the group could envisage a time
when this requirement might be relaxed. If removable media were to be permitted then the VA
recommendation would be an essential requirement for future security.
Implementation unnecessary. Some of the US VA recommendations could not be applied
in the Chinese healthcare organisation. For example, the previous incident report recommended
action to “Develop and issue Government-wide risk analysis criteria”. Currently, the redacted
hospital interacts with government wide systems, including the Chinese national insurance system.
However, they felt that this recommendation could only be implemented at government level,
hence it was not a subject they felt was in their area of responsibility.
Figure 3 presents the resulting customised security incident map for the redacted hospital based
on the VA case study. As we have seen, the development of a specific security incident map from
the GST helps organisations consider their own practices and to assess whether applicable Chinese
security standards address the concerns raised in previous breaches from the United States.
6. Discussion
Previous research showed that GSTs can be used to represent and share lessons from previous
security incidents [25, 43, 45]. In contrast, this paper has presented empirical studies that evaluate
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its acceptance in an industry setting. Through interviews with stakeholders from different roles
in a healthcare organisation, we found that the security professionals were very likely to accept
GSTs and helped to identify the business scenarios where they might be used. However, health-
care professionals were more reluctant probably because this approach did not fit their existing
work patterns or prior knowledge of information security. This can be explained by technological
frames [50]. Professionals from different job roles have different interpretations of technology
based on their own experience and educational background [50]. Previous research has also iden-
tified weaknesses in security incident handling and response [22–24]. Suggestions were made
to improve the information sharing, through the integration of agile principles and practices into
security incident response [22–25, 43–45, 56]. Our approach evaluated the use of GSTs, in a
healthcare context. The results showed that GSTs helped share security lessons with the redacted
hospital. The redistribution of security lessons informed their own practices and helped them to
assess whether applicable security standards addressed the concerns raised in previous breaches
even with those incidents occurred in a different country.
7. Conclusions
The recurrence of past breaches shows that lessons have not been learned from previous secu-
rity incidents. This paper conducted empirical studies to explore whether or not the recommen-
dations from previous security failures could be redistributed using Generic Security Templates.
In particular, we developed a GST from an incident in the United States Veterans Affairs Admin-
istration and used it to explore whether lessons could be applied to a healthcare organisation in
China. We interviewed ten healthcare professionals and five IT professionals and worked with
them to adapt the GST to local standards. The results showed that the security experts in the
healthcare organisation accepted this approach and lessons from a US data breach could inform
security management in the redacted hospital in China. We have performed the study within one
healthcare organisation, therefore, the findings may not reflect potential results from other health-
care organisations around the globe. However, the experience gained from this study provides
the basis for future work in conducting similar studies in other countries and with other security
cultures.
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Table A.3: Participant’s background
No. Position Education Incidents Experience Gender Years
1 Nurse Bachelor Yes Female 3
2 Nurse Bachelor No Female 2
3 Nurse Bachelor Yes Female 5
4 Nurse High School No Female 3
5 Nurse High School No Female 4
6 Nurse High School No Female 5
7 Doctor Master No Male 8
8 Doctor Master Yes Male 8
9 Doctor Bachelor (Hon) No Male 4
10 Doctor Bachelor No Male 5
11 Security Manager Bachelor Yes Male 8
12 Security Staff Master Yes Female 4
13 Security Staff Bachelor (Hon) Yes Male 2
14 Security Staff Bachelor (Hon) Yes Male 3
15 Security Staff Bachelor Yes Male 2
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